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Abstract 
Security of supply in electricity markets has been seen as a critical test for the functioning of the 
markets. This has been especially relevant for the existing spot and futures markets, and less explicit 
for the quality aspect of electricity, which has only to a marginal extent been covered by markets. This 
paper describes the possible steps and some necessary conditions for establishing markets for security 
of supply services in a Danish and Nordic perspective. 
For the adequacy aspect of security concern has been raised that market prices are not sufficiently 
high to secure new generation capacity. In particular the peak power resources do not seem to be 
attractive without some capacity payments. Construction of such markets in an efficient way has been 
broadly discussed in literature, but the linkage with grid investment is less covered.  
There are several possible benefits of having the security aspect covered by a market instead of by 
regulation. First step is to secure that a given level of security is satisfied at the least costs. To have 
this marginal cost in generation, transmission and distribution have to be at comparable levels. The 
argument is that consumers have identical cost of disruptions (Value Of Lost Load, VOLL) whether 
due to generation capacity constraints, capacity/ fault in transmission lines or faults in distribution 
equipment. Costs have to be equal across sectors operating in competitive markets and sectors that are 
directly regulated. If the regulator itself is demanding security of supply services from all three parts 
of the power sector the simplest form of a market would be implemented. This would not result in the 
optimal level of security as the final demand for security would not be reflected, only the regulators 
estimation of costs. If it is possible to reduce the public good property of security of supply a market 
might lead to a more correct level of security, but the largest benefits would be associated with 
possible differences in VOLL among customers.       
Secondly the possibility of individualised security of supply exists. To the degree it is possible to 
exclude customers this would imply that different degrees of security can be supplied to customers 
with different costs of lost load. Examples of this possibility exist, but it is not a widespread practise 
in the liberalised power markets of today. The linkage to the flexible demand element in the existing 
power markets is discussed. Flexible demand and interruptible load share the property of having to 
individually affect the load of customers. If mechanisms are in place to have individual customers 
adjust their load with a warning time the step to having individual interruption is also possible. 
Special emphasis is given to relating the possible markets to the actual disruptions in Denmark.   
As a majority of disruptions (frequency) are related to distribution grid faults the cost of reducing 
these faults relative to the cost of maintaining the capacity reserves that secures that almost no load 
has been lost due to capacity constraints is questioned. Would an integrated market for security 
services transfer resources from capacity reserves to distribution grid infrastructure? Finally is the 
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question of the supply of electricity to all residential customers at the same regional rate in line with 
having different prices for security of supply services to the same residential customers? As it is now, 
the security of supply is varying among the consumers without this being reflected in any difference 
in payments (and in the Danish case without compensation). 
 
1. Welfare gain elements from construction of markets for security of supply 
Security of supply is one aspect of quality services associated with electricity supply. This 
aspect is not priced directly in the price paid for the electricity, neither in the wholesale 
markets nor in retail sale. The costs of securing supply are borne by consumers or producers, 
but it is not directly linked between their individual demand or supply for security of 
supply.  
If markets for this kind of service is constructed what will be the possible gains? 
 
Cost minimisation in securing a given level of security of supply 
 
First it could be expected that a market with competition in the supply of electricity 
security would reduce the cost associated with reaching the level of security. Without a 
market it is not secured that all the possible technologies to increase security of supply are 
made available to the regulator and in particular not in the correct volume. If the regulator 
has all the information available it is however possible to reduce the error relative to the 
market considerably. 
 













Figure 1 Possible loss if incorrect level for security of supply  
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For the elements of costs also involving consumers and their costs of supply interruptions 
we start by examining one common level of security of supply. 
 
For simplification it is assumed that:  
 
• Cost of interruption per energy unit is independent of duration and timing of the 
interruption 
• All consumers are identical with respect to cost of interruption 
• Marginal cost of limiting the expected loss of energy per year is increasing with 
reduction in expected loss 
 
In Figure 1 there is a possible welfare loss if the arbitrarily chosen level of security is too 
low SL or too high SH relative to the level Ŝ where consumer’s real cost of interruption are 
equal to marginal costs of supplying additional security. If security is a pure public good it is 
likely that consumers will express an opinion favouring high levels of security as that is not 
seen as affecting their costs. If authorities and regulators are adjusting to these opinions it is 
possible that we are having too high levels of security and thereby are experiencing a 
welfare loss. The opposite situation can arise if individuals are asked to actually pay 
additional for security and they understate their willingness to pay to enjoy the free ride on 
this service. 
 
Possible loss due to not serving different levels of security to different consumers 












MC Cust 2 
(D2)
MC Cust 3 
(D3)
 
Figure 2 Different interruption costs for consumers 
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In this case we now relax the assumption of consumers having the same costs of 
interruptions. In some studies it has been found that industry is experiencing costs of being 
interrupted than do private households. For households it even plausible that there are quite 
large differences, for example, dependent on whether their heating is dependent on 
electricity supply or even more basic if they are actually at home during the hours where 
interruptions occur. 
 
The demand part of the market for security of supply is particular important for possible 
welfare losses if the costs of lost energy are different among the consumers. In Figure 2 
without a market Customer 2 will be supplied too high security and Customer 3 too low 
security. Only Customer 1 is experiencing a level of security that corresponds to her 
interruption costs. The loss will therefore be the sum of their individual losses. 
A market with consumers included will imply having different levels for security of 
supply for different consumers. Still this seems fine in the case where there is assumed no 
difference in supply costs for different consumers as in the case in Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
Another problematic issue in this simple representation is the difference in costs of 
establishing security of supply to the individual customers. We don’t deal with this here.  
 
2. Public good characteristics of security of supply and changes as a necessary precondition 
for construction of markets 
 
Security of supply is in the literature regarded as a pure public good and by others as not 
characterised as a public good. It is a necessary precondition that security of supply is not a 
pure public good to have a well functioning market without having to use regulate.  
The term ‘Security of supply’ refers to the likelihood that electricity will be supplied 
without disruptions. Thus, often the terms security and adequacy are distinguished so that 
(Oren et al, 2000): 
• security is the ability of the system to withstand sudden disturbances, e.g.,   
• adequacy is the ability of the system to supply the aggregate electric power and 
energy requirements of the consumers at all times, e.g., have enough power capacity, 
enough network capacity, and system functionality.  
 
In recent years, the main argument for regulating of power market with focus on security 
of supply has mainly been the reading of security of supply as a public good. Several papers 
view security of electricity supply as a public good, e.g., Abbott (2001) “This means that 
security is non-rival in public good terms. Security of supply also appears to be nonexclusive 
in that it is difficult to exclude people from benefiting from that reduced risk associated with 
the construction of additional capacity..” Counter wise, Rochlin (2004) states that ”The 
market provision of an adequate reserve margin does not fail the rivalry or the exclusionary 
principles and does not qualify as a public good”.  
In order for us to evaluate these two contradicting statements we start out by the 
economic definition of public goods. Public good are often defined as goods that are non-
excludable as well as non-rival. This means, it is not possible to exclude consumers from 
consumption of the good and at the same time the consumption of the good will not reduce 
the amount of good available for consumption by others. The definition of a public good 
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results in a different demand for good than seen with private goods. Demand for private 
goods is found by adding up the quantities demanded by each individual, whereas, demand 
for public goods is found by adding the individual marginal benefits at each quantity. This 
fundamental difference in demand for goods, results in different problems in the market 
place. Often, public goods traded in market places have to be regulated in order for the 
output to be efficient. This comes from the free rider problem that typically arises in markets 
for public goods.   
The first conclusion to derive form this, is that markets for public goods typically needs 
regulation in order to reach the efficient level of output. That is, if the security of electricity 
supply is seen as a public good, then we need to have regulation in order for us to reach the 
social optimal level of security of electricity supply. But before we decide on whether or not 
we are dealing with a public good, we spend a little more time analysing the two 
requirements non-rival and non-excludable.  
Abbott (2001) states that security of electricity supply is non-exclusive because, once a unit 
of capacity is added to the system all consumers benefit from the increased reliability that it 
provides. Stoft (2003), finds it non-exclusive because, of demand side flaws. He argues that 
since there are no real-time metering and, at the same time, lack of technology required to 
disconnect consumers individually in case of an inadequate supply, security of electricity 
supply is non-exclusive. Counterwise, Rochlin (2004) finds that it is exclusive because, even 
though, it is not possible to exclude consumers ex ante, it is possible to use ex post payment. 
That is, the mechanism to collect charges for using reserves. 
According to Stoft (2003), security of electricity supply is also non-rival because, once 
produced it is unaffected by the amount of consumers that obtains a benefit. This 
corresponds to Abbott (2001) who means that security is non-rival because, “any expansion 
in capacity designed to meet growth in demand not only reduces the risk of black-outs for 
those being supplied from the new plant but also reduces everyone else’s risk at no extra 
cost”. Counter wise, Rochlin (2004) finds that this is not the case since, using reserves 
decreases the reserve margin, and hence, reduces the level of reliability. And when the 
reserve margin is sufficient low, the use of one unit more leads to load shedding.   
The conclusions regarding non-rivalry and non-exclusion are therefore not 
straightforward. Hence, if we should treat security of supply as private instead of public 
good, we need a controversial shift from an ‘obligation to serve’ to ‘obligation to serve at a 
price’. And following we need to see a quality differentiation where security of supply are 
not externalized from the market via, e.g., back-up systems. Finally, we need systems 
operations based not only on supply side flexibility but also demand side management. 
The lack of technology to meet these requirements are partly mentioned by Stoft (2001) 
with lack of real-time metering and real-time billing, which causes a lack of demand 
elasticity in the market and inability to disconnect individual consumers. But recent 
technological developments have enabled individual billing and disconnection excluding 
free riders, wherefore, we find that security of electricity supply does not fail the 
exclusionary principle, and hence, does not qualify as a pure public good. With respect to 
non-rivalry we find all three statements credible and not contrary. If we turn to the 
definition of congestible public goods, we find goods for which congestion reduces the 
benefits to existing consumers when more consumers are accommodated. That is, the 
marginal cost of accommodating an additional consumer is not zero after the point of 
congestion is reached.  
Examining the public good characteristics in relation to security of supply in power 
markets, we conclude that creating markets that involve also the customers demanding 
security is possible without extensive regulation if there are some elements present as: 
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• Exclusion from security is an available and affordable technical solution 
• There is rivalry in this service because some capacities (production, transmission of 
distribution) are congested  
 
It must be possible to exclude customers from the service unless they are paying for the 
service. At the same time the demand for power, transmission or distribution must be near 
the limit where additional demand for this capacity will affect the security of supply for 
other customers. In other words capacity restrictions must be more than only theoretically 
binding. 
 
3. Individual steps in construction of security of supply market construction 
 
In this section we turn to the possible steps in increasing market forces influence on 
allocating resources to security of supply and setting the level of security. 
 
Pre-establishing cost figures and comparability 
 
1. step Securing that marginal costs of supplying security for a given customer is identical 
for possible suppliers of this service (first simplification for aggregated consumption) The 
level of security is “arbitrarily” set at a socially acceptable target. Cost minimisation in 
securing a given level of security of supply. 
 
System adequacy: 
• Costs of securing adequate power capacity 
• Costs of securing adequate transmission capacity 
• Costs of securing adequate distribution capacity 
 
Probabilities for failures:  
• Back-up short term – marginal cost of reducing probability 
• Frequency etc. – marginal cost of reducing probability   
• Transmission and distribution faults – marginal cost of reducing probability   
 
All the system elements contributing to the probability of loss of load should have 
marginal costs for reducing the probability at similar levels. This can be achieved without 
creating a market.  
One basic assumption for the above arguments is that failures and interruptions are 
independent, what will not always be the case.  
In this case there is an option of allowing the supplier of security to supply different levels 
of security to individual customers based on difference in costs of supplying. This is relevant 
for networks  
 
2. step Adjusting level of security of supply to average costs for consumers  (value of lost 
load). 
This does not necessarily involve the construction of a market. The costs for consumers 
(households as well as business) have been estimated from several studies in a large number 
of countries. This can be used for setting a less arbitrarily target for security of supply. This 
will not be as accurate as what would be established if a well functioning market could be 
constructed. This aims at reducing the welfare losses related to Figure 1. 
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3. step. Associating individual customer’s costs of lost load with compensation payments, 
or different payments for security of supply. 
This step is different from a construction with compensation payments identical for different 
customers. Such a scheme is one option as a regulatory instrument in the second step. If the 
objective is to reduce the possible welfare losses as described in the Figure 2, this step will 
require some kind of a market that involve consumers. The market need not necessarily be a 
separate market, but could be an integration of the security costs in ordinary power markets, 
but requires that individual consumers are charged and chose their level of demand based 
on different prices.    
 
4. step This step involves customers even more as this targets the possibility of having 
different costs of interruption depending on the duration and the timing of interruption. 
This would involve a more sophisticated market, were it is quite unrealistic that customers 
should monitor price movements so closely, but automatic equipment following general set 
price parameters could make individual demand respond to price signals. 
 
How much can be achieved without relaxing the characteristics of a public good? 
Only step 1 and 2 is possible without relaxing the public good characteristics. If the real 
market from step 3 with participation of consumers is to be established it must be possible to 
exclude customers from security of supply to give them an incentive to reveal their 
willingness to pay for this service.  Interruptible supply to customers and meetring 
equipment is needed. 
How much can changes in the functioning of existing power markets contribute 
There is much to achieve from improving the functioning of existing power markets 
rather than just creating new isolated markets for security of supply. The more markets that 
are created the less volume in each market, the higher transaction costs and the more risk for 
exemption of market power. Therefore improvements in the spot and regulating power 
markets should be emphasised.  
Demand response is one of the most obvious ways of improving how we establish 
adequate resources. With increased price response in the existing market, the load duration 
curve would flatten and the profitability of new power (or transmission) capacity would 
increase. This adequacy part of security of supply is thus possible to influence by the 
existing markets to a large extent, whereas the problems caused by faults in transmission 
and distribution equipment is less directly influenced by the existing power markets. 
 
4. Final comments 
 
What is discussed in this paper is based on an ongoing project and conclusions can not yet 
be drawn.  
Is it possible to create new markets for security of supply and is it better than improving 
on existing markets? Technological developments will make it possible to create markets in 
the future, but it is probably advisable to increase effectiveness of existing markets as at least 
part of the possible welfare losses can be reduced by including different forms of demand 
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